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COMMENTARY: RE-POSITIONING HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE ON "ASIAN" PERSPECTIVES
Sharon K.Hornt

I. INTRODUCTION
Within multiple global power configurations mapped along
developed/developing countries, and North/South divide, ongoing
statist "Asian" human rights debates predominantly line up on an
East/West axis, characterized by competing universalism and
relativism as core oppositional normative and empirical claims.2 The
western understanding of universal human rights generally references
and emphasizes a vision of cvil and political rights shaped by a liberal
Western tradition. The challenge of East Asian states to this
understanding of human rights has cultural, political, and economic
dimensions. Underlying the charges of Western cultural imperialism,
is a post-colonialist legacy, and a suspicion that assertions of Western
universal human rights are pretexts for intervention in the domestic
affairs of other countries. Thus, "what appears, from the Western
perspective, to be a noble campaign for universal rights, is interpreted
from an Asian perspective, as cultural imperialism." 3 The charge of

*Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. J.D., New York University School ofLaw
(1980), Fulbright Professor of Law, China University of Politics and Law (1986-88).
I thank Professor Dellapena and the editors of the Buffalo International Law Journal

for the invitation to develop this commentary from my informal remarks delivered at
the Asian Perspectives on Human Rights Panel, ASIL Annual Meeting, April 6, 1995,

and published in 89 ASIL Proc. 146 (1995). Also, thanks to Penny Andrews and
Pamela Goldberg for reading and commenting on an early draft and my research

assistant Melissa Fraser for helpful manuscript preparation work.
2 For

a recent article summarizing some of the discussions and papers of a workshop
held in Hokone, Japan (June 1995), The Growth of East Asia and Its Impact on
Human Rights. See Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights:
Reflections on an East West Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 641 (1996). In a thoughtful

effort to identify relatively persuasive East Asian criticisms of traditional Western
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cultural imperialism is also made from the economically smug position
of nation-states who are widely touted as "high performance"
economies who have engineered the economic miracle of rising GNPs
that has apparently made many developed countries nervous.4
These engineers of "economic miracles" are in turn criticized by
human rights activists and scholars for an ideological subterfuge that
attempts to mask their authoritarianism behind culturalist relativism
claims and for their assertion of a false dilemma between civil and
political rights and economic and social rights.' At the same time that
the Asian "economic miracle" is heralded by Asian governments and
Western observers, other voices such as NGOs, dissident, religious,
labor and other community voices suggest that beneath the "miracles,"
there are human costs such as labor rights protection, child labor,
industrial safety conditions, poor living conditions, low wages and
underpayment, gender based sexual harassment, violence, abuse, and
discrimination, that have been rendered invisible or marginalized by
statist perspectives. In a recent public petition to the Chinese leaders,
a Beijing religious group points to the poverty and suffering of the
peasants, and the basic economic and housing problems facing urban
residents:
These are all problems that cannot be ignored.
The cries of the impoverished and deprived have
already reached to the heavens, and yet little

approaches, Daniel Bell points to the emerging "new discourse on human rights"
reflected in the views of critical intellectuals in East Asia, and argues for drawing upon
indigenous cultural traditions as moral authority to persuade East Asians of the value
of human rights. However, Bell's discussion appears to assume a statist perspective

and also marginalizes the fll range of actors that impact on human rights practice and
policy.
' Michael Freeman, Human Rights: Asia and the West, in HuMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIAPACIFIC 14 (James T.H. Tang ed., 1995).
4 See, e.g., The East Asian Miracle:Economic Growth andPublic Policy, Oxford
University Press for the World Bank (1993)(World Bank report).
s See, e.g., Li Xiaorong, "Asian Values" & the UniversalityoffHuman Rights, CHINA
RIGHTS FORUM 32-36 (1961).
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attention is being paid to the sufferings of common
people .... We should be able to live with dignity
and our rights should be protected and guaranteed,
for a society's wealth belongs to all its people and
to respect the honor and ambition of each and
every person is an essential
condition for the
6
advancement of society!
When judged against a more inclusive assessment of this
"representation" on all their citizens, the claims of Asian nation-states
to represent the best interests of their citizens is suspect. The
invocation of "Asian" culture or a "different" standard as legitimation
for a culturally relativist human rights claim is thus suspect, partial,
and problematic.
In the previous symposium issue of this Journal, 7 a number of
human rights scholars and a diplomat presented a range of
perspectives defining, defending and criticizing various "Asian"
approaches to human rights.8 In the spirit of further engaging these
perspectives, this commentary offers some observations, and suggests
several locations from which some of the more dominant statist human
rights debates can be fruitfully re-positioned. As specific sources for
encouraging more inclusive and human-centered discourses and
implementation approaches, I cite the evolution of the human
development concept, draw upon insights from domestic and
international women's/human rights strategies, and turn up the volume
on domestic Chinese women's rights and Chinese dissident voices
within and outside China as a reminder of localized sites of struggles.
Throughout this commentary, I include references to a range of

6 Beijing Protestant Holy Spirit Association, A Wordfor the Poor, CHINA RIGHTS
FORUM 14 (1995).
' Symposium on EastAsianApproaches to Human Rights, 2 BuFF. J. OF INT'L L. 193
(1996).
8 I also mark "Asian" to acknowledge its shifting geo-political boundaries. For a
history of East Asia, see, e.g., ARTHuR COTTERELL, EAST ASIA: FROM CHINESE
PREDOMINANCE TO THE RISE OF THE PACIFIC RIM (1993).
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constructive strategies for human rights work pursued by diverse
Asian NGO groups and international human rights activists and
organizations.
II. INTERROGATING "ASIAN" HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATES

Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan,9 re-presenting the "East Asian"
perspective, echoes previous defenses of Asia's "different standard,"
and emphasized the governmental and relativist position set forth in
the Bangkok Declaration."0 Acknowledging the universality of human
rights, he argues that rights, justice, and order are obtained in different
ways at different times in the context of a diversity of historical
experiences, cultures, and social and political arrangements for a
particular nation. With a gesture towards diversity, he also notes that
these debates over the proper approach to human rights is not just
between Asia and the West, but also between and within Asian
countries." In assessing the challenges even with these diversity
caveats of Asian governments, it's also important to keep in mind,
"when we consider Asian objections to the human rights doctrine on
the ground that it entails the domination of Asia by the West, not only
that it entails domination of some Asians by others, but also that this
domination is not culturally acceptable to those who are dominated." 2
While commending the Governments' recognition of the rights of

" Singapore's Ambassador to the United Nations at the time of the ASIL panel from
which the symposium issue developed its articles.
10

In the Asian Regional preparatory meeting for World Conference on Human Rights

which took place in Vienna June 14 - 25, 1993, Asian governments met to develop

a common position on human rights for the global agenda. The resulting document,
the Bangkok declaration was signed by 40 Asian governments. It recognized the

universality of human rights, prioritized economic development rights, and claimed
a relativist interpretation approach in the context of historical, cultural and regional
particularities. For the text of the Declaration, see Appendix I in JAMES T.H. TANG,
HuiiMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTHE ASIA PACIFIC (1995).
" Bilahari Kim Hee P.S. Kausikan, An East Asian Approach to Human Rights, 2
BuFF. J. OF INT'LL. 263 (1996).
12 Freeman, supranote 2, at 15.
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women, and children, and affirming the universality, indivisibility and
interdependence of rights, an NGO response to the Bangkok
Declaration also stated: "Yet the Final Draft Declaration, in several
significant respects reflects the continued attempts by many
governments of the Asia-Pacific region to avoid their human rights
obligations, to put the state before the people and to avoid
for their failures in the
acknowledging their obligations to account 13
rights."
human
for
protection
promotion and
Furthermore, there are some tricky slippages in Ambassador
Kausikan's defense of Asia's "different standard" that should give one
pause. "Asian"' as reflected in this official narrative emphasizes
"Asian" collective and community notions as basic values and
consensus building in opposition to "Western" individualistic rights
and adversarial legal institutions and social relations. However,
Ambassador Kausikan also points to the diversity of Asian cultures
and approaches and criticizes the insensitivity of Western responses
for their insensitivity to "the nuances of different Asian" voices. He
thus speaks of a monolithic "West" and a monolithic "American"
response in particular, within an implicitly polar debate. Yet
"Western," like "Asian" is really an idea, a cultural concept of identity,
historically situated and contingent. Despite the calls for more
complex dialogue and mutual understanding by Asian government
leaders, the "West" is thus ironically reified and positioned as a
convenient, monolithic oppositional target.
Ambassador Kausikan also marshals the diversity of Western
voices and internal critical voices to support the morally superior,
common sense, "Asian" position. He is thus invoking the critiques of

13The Asia-PacificGovernments 'finaldraftDeclaration:an NGO response.April

2,1993, in HUMANRIGrrs

ANDIwERNAONALRELATIONS iN Th- ASIA PAcIFIC 211

(James T.H. Tang ed., 1995). The NGO response was signed by representatives of

I10 NGOs in the region.
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scholars, writers, and news media, 14 non-governmental voices, to
support his assertion of a position that privileges the governmental
perspective. If one were to seriously argue for sensitivity and the
rejection of double standards, then let's all aspire towards a clarity of
definitions and sensitivity towards the nuances and diversity in the
perceived "other" positions. And if we are to move beyond the
current statist gridlock in East Asian human rights discourse, we need
to stop implicitly or explicitly conflating the voice of the state, even a
paternalistic competent one, with the diversity of voices of the
individual citizens of a state, international and local non-governmental
organizations, intergovernmental and multilateral bodies. Ambassador
Kausikan has suggested that the real question is what works. I would
add: What is working --for whom? Who decides what is "working"?
Or to put an official Chinese pragmatic spin on it, what "mice" do we
want to catch?"5 When there are assertions of "difference,"
particularly by privileged actors in positions of power, we should ask:
who benefits from these assertions of difference? Who asserts these
differences/? On whose behalf? Whose voices and experiences are
marginalized, rendered invisible to ensure the clarity of an oppositional
East/West, universalist/relativist paradigm?
What issues are
16
foreclosed by claims of imperialism?
In addition to the challenge of engaging the full range of human
See, e.g., Symposium, On East Asian Approaches to Human Rights, supranote 7,

at 270 (cites Rodney Smolla for an absolutist position regrading free speech, and Cass
Sunstein for a critique of this position, and Richard Simmons, President of the
International Herald Tribune, for his apology to the Singapore government and
acceptance of the correct application of Singapore law in the libel suit involving the

newspaper).
" In a pragmatic assertion of how to decide a correct policy, Deng Xiaoping has
stated: "It doesn't matter whether it's a black cat, or a white cat, as long as it catches
mice."
6 For example, prior to the UN Population Conference in Cairo (1994), 114 of the
139 cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church voted unanimously to oppose what they
portrayed as "a pervasive feminist presence" at the Conference. They warned that the
proposals being presented on abortion and women's rights sponsored by the United
States reflected "cultural imperialism." What a brilliant discursive move of
appropriation and in 'the name of the Father.' N.Y. TIMs, June 15, 1994, at 1.
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ights voices on the regional, international, or local level, a dislodging
of statist human rights discourse would also require critical attention
to the task of identifying appropriate sources for determining the
content of a human rights, and the unavoidably culturally overdetermined task of "reading" the content for its meaning and intent,
perhaps the problem of post-modernist interpretation. 7 Michael
Davis has identified as sources for determining aspirations and
assessing human rights implementation the following: international
declarations, constitutions, legislation and white papers, peace
charters, NGO reports, human rights manifestos, academic or legal
discourse. Davis suggests a discourse approach that asks who is
saying what, for what purposes or values, through what channels, and
with what effects. Applying this to China, he concludes there is a disjuncture between rights promised and the actuality of the situation that
reflects the "pathology of an underdeveloped constitutional order."18
He identifies a rectangular relationship between dissidents NGOs,
foreign governments and China in human rights lobbying. However,
I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish between dialogue as
a process of discovery, and "dialogue" as unilateral positional
assertions of already formulated views. China's "discourse with the
outside world" discussed by Davis and much of the discourse of
nation-states "with" each other, belongs it seems to me in the latter
category.
Davis' discourse approach and a focus on process, institutions,

17 For a collection of essays by Hdlne Cixou, Edward Said, Julia Kristeva, Terry
Eagleton and others exploring how the de-stabilizing of a concept of a coherent unified
self affects strategies to defend human rights see, e.g., Freedom and Interpretation: The
Oxford Amnesty Lectures (Barbara Johnson, ed., 1992). However, it should be noted
that these essays focus implicitly on civil and political rights violations and
marginalize the empowering role that contingency plays when considering economic

and social rights. After all, it is precisely because economic and social structures are
constructed and contingent that the possibility and hope lies in their re-construction
as more human social orders.
"8Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: Chinaand The Bangkok Declaration,
2 BuFi. J. OF INT'L L. 215, 218-20 (1996).
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and values analysis are helpful for moving towards a more dynamic
understanding of rights implementation. To build upon this approach,
I would suggest more critical attention to a fuller range of
international actors such as transnationals, the role of language itself,
the role of multiple audiences, the role of the "narrator"/interpreter of
these sources and these processes, and the discontinuities between
content, the "readings" engendered, and the discursive negotiations
that create or legitimate new values and concepts. More analytical
attention needs to be paid to language as a site for discursive and
political contests. For example, despite similar sounding "vocabulary"
of human rights discourse, when one moves beyond an implicit focus
on civil and political rights discourse and look at the indivisibility of
rights addressed by development policy-makers or women's rights
activists and theorists, it becomes apparent that "vocabulary" is a key
site for ideological and political power/empowerment battles. One
recent example was the drafting debates surrounding the bracketed
language of the draft Platform of Action for the Fourth World
Conference on Women and the objections raised by the Holy See,
Muslim and Catholic countries to the use of terms like "family,"
"sex," "gender," to refer to any arrangement other than a heterosexual
relationship of marriage.19
In her symposium essay, Christina Cerna, an attorney with the
Organization of American States, focuses on specific speeches of
Asian leaders, as useful sources of "explanations" of Asian's different
definition and content of human rights to western and European
audiences. Cerna suggests that there appears to be no difference in
definitions of human rights between Western and Asian rights and that
the differences lies in implementation approaches. In response to the
Indonesian governmental assertion of national implementation

19 See also ENGLiSH-CHNEsE LEXCON OF WOMEN AND THE LAW (YINGHAN FuNU Yu

(Sharon K. Horn & Xin Chunying, 1995) for an example of an
attempt to focus on some of the cross-cultural, linguistic, and political translation

FALU ClliUi SHI)

issues embedded in key human rights/women's rights terms and concepts. See infra,
at 12 and notes regarding the evolution of the consensus and understanding of key
development concepts and terminology.
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approaches, Cema attempts to suggest a middle ground: only in cases
where there is no national implementation should the international
community play a role and technical assistance should only be
provided to countries with the political will to democratize.20
However, this "reading" also invests the "speaking" of government
leaders with more explanatory and communication intent than a more
cynical "reading" of geo-political posturing would suggest.
Furthermore, in the context of this international "explanation," and
Indonesia's position as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement
("NAM"), certainly the audience is not only Western and European
audiences, but also the 108 member states of NAM. And given
domestic media coverage, the audience would also include the citizens
of these states and the "speaking" of these government leaders would
be an encoded message reinforcing the primacy of the government's
privileged position as claimed representative of the interests of its
citizens. Finally, the balancing of international intervention with
national implementation suggested by Cerna side-steps some hard
questions: Who and how does this body decide that the national
implementation is inadequate or nonexistent? Who and how will
"political will to democratize" be measured or identified? For
example, in the context of China, an assessment looking exclusively
to the political will of the regime in power might lead to the dismissal
of consideration of any technical assistance initiatives that might
contribute to creating the conditions necessary for democracy.
Cema's approach thus implicitly illustrates the necessity of developing
multi-layered approaches that focus on multiple actors and sources of
social change.
As historical background for his analysis of the role of legal
rhetoric in Chinese social change, Professor Dellapena first recounts
a conventional narrative of China's legal tradition, its characteristics
and some continuities of this tradition under the Communist rule: the
resort to guanxi (relationships), a preference for informal settlement
" Christina Ni Cema, East Asian Approachesto Human Rights, 2 BuFF. J. OF INr'L
L. 201 (1996).
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of disputes,21 a Marxist ideological hostility to law as a tool of the
elite, and the lack of a specially trained cadre ofjudges, lawyers, and
prosecutors. He then argues that the demands of the student leaders
during the 1989 Democracy Movement for democracy, and an end to
corruption through a rule of law was ignored by the Western press
and misunderstood by China's leaders, both in light of the condition
of these "octogenarians" and these traditional Chinese attitudes
towards law. 2 He concludes by calling for more effective use of
rhetoric in communicating our concerns about the rule of law to
China's leaders. While I agree that "we in the West" have not done
a good job of understanding events in China, this must be viewed in
the context of a long history of more than a hundred years of U.S.China (mis)understanding.' In the context of broader Asian debates

21 It should

be noted that recent work by foreign scholars analyzing records from the
vfing-Qing archives has suggested that Chinese were much more litigious and resorted
to law suits much more frequently than has been previously understood. See, e.g.,
Thomas Buoye, From Patrimonyto Commodity: ChangingConcepts ofLandAnd
Social Conflict in GuangdongProvince during the QianlongReign (1736-1975), 14
LATEIMvEmAL CHINA 2 (1993); Nancy Park and Robert Antony, ArchivalResearch
in QingLegalHistory,14LAEIMEmiAL CHIrA 1 (1993); Tahirih Lee, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 1335 (1993) on law, society and commerce in late Qing and early Republican
China. I thank Jim Feinerman and Stan Lubman for pointing these cites out to me.
22 But see, e.g., Margaret Ng, Are Rights Culture-bound?, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND
CHINESE VALUES 67 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995); "One may acknowledge that the
concept of rights is generally "alien" to the Chinese tradition in its past andpresent
state. But this does not make out the case that rights are alien to Chinese society by
nature. Nor does it establishes that it is therefore legitimate to exclude Chinese
society from application of human rights." (emphasis in original). For an argument
that the modern concept of human rights is not alien to Chinese soil and discussing
four principles, the ideologies of human rights (ren quan zhu yi), tolerance (kuan rong
zhu yi), resistance (di kang zhu yi), and neo-constitutionalism (xin xian zheng zhu yi),
to the development of a contemporary theory of human rights for Chinese society; see
also Du Ganjian and Song Gang, Relating Human Rights to Chinese Culture: the
FourPaths of the ConfucianAnalects and the FourPrinciplesof a New theory of
Benevolence, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 20.
SSee, e.g., THE MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE IN CHINA AND AMERICA (John K. Fairbank
ed., 1974); J.A.G. ROBERTS, CHINA THROUGH WESTERN EYES: THE Tw~rIET
CEmiY (1992); THE AMERICAN IMAGE OF CHINA (Benson Lee Grayson ed., 1979);
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on human rights approaches, the China case also underscores the
importance of understanding the interrelated class, political, and
gender aspects of domestic human rights rhetoric and strategies played
out on an international screen. What has increasingly become clear is
that the bloodshed on June 4 was also the result of a political failure
of leadership and tragic strategic mistakes on everyone's part.24
There is also another possible "reading" of the communication

between Chinese student leaders and China's leaders. Rather than
"misunderstanding" the student demands, perhaps the octogenarians
understood very well the "message"" the students were

and Steven W. Mosher, CHINA MISPERCEIVED: AMERICAN ILLUSIONS AND CHINESE
REALrrY (1990). For Chinese views of American society, see, e.g., Liu Zongren, Two
YEARS IN THE MELTING POT: FROM BEhJING TO CHICAGO-THE ADVENTURES OF A
CHINESE NEWSMAN IN AMERICA (1984); and LAND WrmoUr GHOSTS: CHINESE
IPRESSIONS OF AMERICA FROM THEMID-NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT (R.

David Arkush & Leo 0. Lee eds., 1989).
24 For observations regarding the class-bias and engendered nature of the student
leadership, see, e.g., W.P. Alford, Making a goddess ofdemocracyfrom loose sand:
Thoughts on human rights in the People'sRepublic of China,HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 65-80 (An-Na'im ed.,
1992) (pointing out that the students were motivated by a mixture of idealism and selfinterest and asserted narrow demands that did not invoke the range of freedoms at
stake); and Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in China: The Specter ofHuman
Rights and Thoughts Towards (an)otherVision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 249,
286-90 (1992)(arguing that the failure of the student leaders to include gender issues
and analysis resulted in their failure to make the ideological connection between
patriarchal violence and the authoritarian crackdown in the square). For a translated
collection of some diverse dissident voices, see, e.g., NEw GHOSTS, OLD DREAMS:
CHINESE REBEL VOICES (1992). For reports of ongoing violations see, e.g., Asia
Watch, Anthems of Defeat: Crackdown in Hunan province 1989-1992 (1992); and
CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, the Journal of Human Rights in China, a group of Chinese
democracy activists based in New York.
Framed by Dellapena as demands for democracy and reform through rule of law.
26 Liu surveys past strategies, such as wall posters, journals, leaflets, group
discussions, and small demonstrations, prior to the 1989 crackdown and the survival
strategies that dissidents developed since then. He identifies a shift since 1992 by
dissidents to setting up new organizations with focused political groups, that act
openly and legally, and the increasing use of open petition letters signed by
individuals. Liu Qing,Devoted to DemocracyandHumanRights: the Development
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communicating.
Bunkered behind the compound walls of
Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leaders accurately read this message as a
challenge to their power, to the autocratic power of the Party, and a
demand for a rule of law that would undermine their privileged
position outside and above the law. The entrenched efforts of the
Party leaders to protect its power at all costs has consequences
beyond China's borders. As Liu Qing states so powerfully:
The continued survival and progress of dissidents is
not only crucial to the future of Chinese society, but is
equally important to the maintenance of international
peace and stability. No matter how you look at it, the
existence of dissidents in China attests to the diversity
of opinion in China; it is no longer the silent obedient
society it was considered. Although these voices
remain weak, they still serve to hold the autocratic
system in check to some extent... if some dissidents
are allowed to continue their efforts, then the
foundation for democracy and human rights in China
will gradually be established. The international
community must not ignore or forget China's dismal
human rights record. After all, it is not a good thing
for the world when the rulers of a country of 1.2
billion people with a rapidly expanding economy view
the values of democracy and human rights as
26
antiethical to their interests.

II. CHALLENGES OF THE NEw(OLD) GLOBAL DIs-ORDER
To de-center the state from its current privileged discursive
position in human rights debates, we need to open the aperture to
bring into political focus a global legacy of rampant militarism,

ofthe DissidentMovement, CuNARIGHTs FORuM, Winter 1995, at 4-7.
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environmental degradation, and pervasive social and economic

inequality.27 One tactic is to re-focus on historical situated human

beings, and to foreground the "human" in human rights that can often
get lost in geo-political contests between states or in the focus on
selective quantitative macro-economic indicators of growth and

progress. As the twentieth century draws to a close, contrary to the
Western liberal faith in the idea and inevitability of progress, this

century has not produced a "modem world" that could be described
as peaceful,28 advanced or morally just in human and ecological
terms.29 Contrary to conventional media narratives that chart

international politics as the business of ambassadors, presidents,
legislators, and other government actors, the gendered dimensions of
international politics and the intersection of gender, peace, security,

and economic justice has been exposed and analyzed."0

' In 1992, the richest 20% of the world's developed countries had incomes 60 times
greater than the poorest 20%. The marginalized, those excluded from the economic
and social goods of development represent over 80% of the global community. 1992
UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1992).
' In 1986, the International Year of Peace, the world military expenditures reached
$900 billion, and by 1991, passed the $1,000 billion mark. During the period of
1975-85, military expenditures accounted for 40% of the increase in foreign debt of
developing countries. JEANNE VICKERS, WOMEN AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRisIs

Ix (1993).

See, e.g., JEREMY BRECHER AND TIM COSTELLO, GLOBAL VILLAGE OR GLOBAL
PILLAGE: ECONOMIC REcONSTRUCTION FROM THE BoTroM Up (1994); BRIAN
29

BURROws, ALAN MAYNE, DR. PAUL NEWBURY, INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: A
HANDBOOK FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1991); and GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION AND

THE TmD WORLD (Robert 0. Slater et al eds., 1993).
o For example, Cynthia Enloe has analyzed the gendered dimensions of this political
system. Suggesting that the "personal is international," Enloe exposes the
international system as one that relies not only on capital and military weapons, but
also on the "control of women as symbols, consumers, workers, and emotional
comforters." She suggests that women working in the sex tourism industry, on military
bases, as diplomatic wives, as cheap domestic and factory labor, as well as
multinationals and governments are all significant international actors. CYNTHIA
ENLOE, MAKING FEMINIST SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL PoLmcs: BANANAS, BEACHES,
& BASES (1990). See also J.ANN, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL SECURIrY (1992); GENDER AND
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In 1990, of the world's 5.3 billion people, 2.63 billion were
women; more than half (55%) of the world's women live in Asia.31 As
the gap between rich and poor widens, the picture of poverty,
dislocation, suffering, and inequality clearly has a woman's face.
"Women still constitute 70% ofthe world's poor and two-thirds of the
world's illiterates. They occupy 14% of managerial and administrative
jobs, 10% of parliamentary seats and 6% of the cabinet positions."32
Of the world's 18 million refugees, some 75-80% of the total is
comprised of women and their dependent children.33 Despite several
world conferences,34 the adoption of the Nairobi Forward Looking
Strategies, and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),3 s while there has been
progress in some regions or countries, across different economic and
social systems, women continue to be excluded from access to
political and economic decision-making, and suffer due to "domestic"
violence, gender-based war crimes, violations of women's human
rights and bodily integrity, and political persecution and

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland
"' THE WORLD'S WOMEN: TRENDS AND STAnSTICS 1970-90.
32

eds., 1991).

1995 UNDPHUMANDEVELOPMENTREPORT 14(1995).

11 U.S. COMMrrTEE FOR REFUGEES, 1993 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY (1993). This
does not include an additional 25 million internally displaced and persons in "refugeelike status." But as Pamela Goldberg points out, exact figures are also difficult to
ascertain due to the fluidity of refugees populations, the instability of living conditions
of refugees, the lack of resources, and a general disinclination to dis-aggregate
statistics on refugee populations by gender or age. Pamela Goldberg, Where in the
World is there SafetyforMe?, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
FEMI ST PERsPECTvES (Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper eds., 1995). For
discussions of refugee issues and demography of refugee populations, see also SUSAN
FORBES-MARTIN, REFUGEE WOMEN (1992).
' WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN IN NAIROBI (1985), RIo EARTH SUMMIT (1992),
WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN VIENNA (1993), CAIRO INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1994), 1995 WORLD SUMMIrr ON
SoCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN COPENHAGEN.

35 Openedforsignature,Dec. 18, 1979,34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.

Doe. A/34/36 (1979).
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discrimination.36
While the statistics cited can not begin to adequately convey the
accompanying human suffering and costs of human rights abuses, they
do underscore the urgent need for radical change in the long-standing
premises of social, economic, and political life and for more effective
responses. 37 The Platform of Action adopted by the 1995 Fourth
World Conference on Women governmental meeting, calls upon
governments to take strategic action in the following critical areas of
concern: poverty, education, health care, violence against women,
economic structures and policies, decision-making at all levels, human
rights, media stereotypes and access, management of natural resources
and safeguarding of the environment, and the rights of the girl child.
The Platform emphasized as in past international statements that the
elimination of these abuses are crucial for the future and possibility of
achieving a peaceful, stable and equitable world.38
Beginning in 1990, the United Nations Development Programme
SSee, e.g., CHARLOTTE BUNCH ET AL., DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: THE GLOBAL
CAMPAIGN AND VIENNA TRIBUNAL FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS (1994); WITHOUT
RESERVATION: THE BEIING TRmUNAL ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN

RIGHTS ( Niamh Reilly ed. 1996); KATARINA TOMAsEvsKI, WOMEN AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1993).
37 See, e.g., 1995 UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 7 (1995) calling for this

fundamental reassessment. In the post-Cold war dis-order, the conflicts, instability,
and violence in Third World countries will create tensions (and migration flows) to
industrialized countries. "Therefore, in this era of weapons of mass destruction and
jet travel, the core of industrialized democracies, despite its best efforts, cannot
insulate itself The new and old disorder in the Third World is destined to have global
ramifications that could have a major impact on the future of the industrialized world.
But there may be an element of poetic justice in this after all." Mohammed Ayoob, The
New-Old Disorderin the Third World, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF
MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 59, 75 (1995).
36 Report of Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 4-15 September 1995).
A/Conf. 177/20 17 October 1995. For a summary of the Platform, see Donna
Sullivan, Envisioning Women's Human Rights: What Was Achieved in Beiing?
CHINARIGHTS FORUM 19 (1995). For an analysis of the Platform in the context of the
history of the world's women's rights movement, see CHARLOTrE BUNCH ET AL.,
BEiING '95: A GLOBAL REFERENDUM ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN. Center for
Women's Global Leadership on line at: cwgl@igc.org.

224 BUFFALO JOURATAL OFINTERATATIONAL LAW

[Vol.3

(UNDP) has published an annual Human Development Report ranking
all countries according to their "level of development." The first
report introduced the concept of human development and its
measurement. Subsequent reports focused on the role of international
trade and markets in development, the introduction of an expanded
concept of security to include human security, and the relationship
between gender and development. As an alternative to the per capita
income indicator used by the World Bank in its annual World
Development Report, UNDP introduced a new indicator for these
annual reports, the human development index (HDI).39 The HDI has
four components: productivity, equity, sustainability, and
empowerment of people.40 The HDI "measures the average
achievement of a country in basic human capabilities. The HDI
indicates whether people lead a long and healthy life, are educated and
knowledgeable and enjoy a decent standard of living."41 As the
evolving international development policy consensus reflects,
"[d]evelopment patterns that perpetuate today's inequities are neither
sustainable nor worth sustaining."42

" Since its introduction, the HDI has also been criticized for its conceptual,
methodological, and technical flaws. However, some of these critiques also
acknowledge that the UNDP introduced the -DI, intending it to be developed in light
of experience, thus leaving it vulnerable to attacks. But even critics conclude, the
normative function of the HDI in representing the "broad consensus in development
policy" is significant. See, e.g., Irmgard Ntlbler, The Human Development Index
Revisited INTERECONOMIMCS, July/August 1995 at 171-76.
40
For a discussion of how the HDI is calculated, see UNDP HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995 at 134-35.
41 The 1995 UNDP Human Development

Report introduces two other indexes: a
gender-related development index (GDI)and a gender empowerment index (GEM).
The HDI supplements the HDI and focuses on the same variables as the HDI and also
disaggregates data by gender to focus on inequality between men and women as well
as average achievement of all people. The greater the gender disparities in a given
country, the lower its GDI will be compared with its -DI. The GEM focuses on the
extent to which women and men are able to actively participate in economic and
political life and decision-making. UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 73 (1995).
For explanation of computation of the GDI, see 130-31.
42 UNDP HUMAN DEELOPMENT REPORT 19 (1994).
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In the face of pervasive social injustice, human suffering and
environmental destruction created by inter-related global, regional,
and domestic factors, and powerful economic and political
international actors, Asian nation-states continue to speak and argue
in the anachronistic register of the 19th century, while positioning
themselves as benevolent patriarchs. When international actors now
include multilateral institutions, transnational corporations or
multinational corporations, and local, regional and international
NGOs, as well as international financial institutions such as the World
bank and the International Monetary Fund, how can a privileged
statist human rights narrative be justified in the face of the impact of
these powerful non-state actors both on the reconfiguration of the
global (dis)order and in re-mapping the human and natural
landscape?43

III. HUMAN RIGHTS BEYOND STATE-CENTERED PARADIGMS
The experience of Asian NGOs illustrates some of the
opportunities for collaboration between human rights scholars,
professionals, and grassroots activists, as well as some of the
challenges in working across differences in experience, class and
expertise. Since the last decade, there has been an "explosion" of

" For example, there are over 37,000 transnational corporations ("TNCs") with over
170,000 foreign affiliates, that control abut 70% of products in international trade.
They play a powerful role in light manufacturing in export processing zones in the
developing world where over 65%, more than 2.6 million, of the workers are women
working in often poor working conditions. They produce 95% of the food
manufactured in the U.S. And dominate the food agribusiness industry in the North.
WEDO, CODES OF CONDuCr FOR TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: STRATEGIES
TOwARD DEMOCRATIC GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 2-5 (1995). For an interesting
discussion of the impact of non-state actors on world politics and foreign policies, and
a critique of the limits of the statist approach, See THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, ET AL.,
BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC
STRuCTuREs AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (1995).
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Asian NGOS,44 both quantitatively and qualitatively, that address the
problems of militarization, intolerable poverty, permanent
environmental degradation, the exploitation of women, children and
religious or ethnic minorities, and the abuses of prevailing
authoritarian regimes. 45 Clarence J. Dias has identified three strands

of the Asian human rights movement human rights movement:
struggles against authoritarian political regimes; delivery of basic
services and education programs to the rural poor; and focus on

national development programs. Although these activists did not
explicitly start out with a human rights agenda, they quickly turned
to human rights activism as a means to (1) empowerment of the
impoverished; (2) securing accountability of those who wield power

and control over resources; (3) participation of the oppressed; and (4)

44 In the U.N. framework, an NGO is any international organization not established

by international intergovernmental agreement, but can include" organizations that
accept membership designated by government authorities, provided such membership
does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization." EDMUND JAN
OSMANSZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS (Taylor and Francis eds., 1990).

The Union of International
Associations (UIA) maintains a registry of NGOs in accordance with UN
recommendations and ECOSOC criteria. However, UIA has stated that "(a) clear and
unambiguous theoretically acceptable definition of international NGOs remain to be
formulated." UIA, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS App. 5, sec. 2.2
(1988/89). Some of the characteristics that have been identified as NGO
characteristics include independence and autonomy from governments, grassroots base
of support and activities, non-governmental source of funding, and a not-for-profit
purpose. While there have been recent divisive international debates over the
definition of an NGO, I have discussed the limits of current definitions and suggest
that in the context of China, we need to focus on the instrumentalist and contextualized
applications of a proposed definition and keep in the foreground a dialogue shaping
an NGO agenda as distinct from competing international governmental agendas.
Sharon K. Hom, Listeningfor Diversity: Broaden DebateAmong Rights Groups in
the Round-Up to 1995, CHINA RIGHTs FORUM, Winter 1993, at 12-15.
45 For a listing of local, national, and regional NGOS or people's organizations
(groups formed by sectors of society, e.g. peasants, laborers, fisher folk, women), see,
e.g., AsIAN REGIONAL REsOuRCE CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTs EDUCATION (ARRC)
(1993) (A Directory of Asian Organizations Related to Human Rights Education
Work).
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asserting values such as social and ethical values that should underlie
res-structuring of asocial orders.
Dias also identifies three main categories of people involved in the
human rights activism in Asia: intellectuals, professionals, and
activists. He describes the approach of the legal elite of working
within the existing law in "test cases" and in "public interest litigation"
to redress violations of civil and political rights, and the tensions of
this liberal approach with the goals of activists who view reform as
part of a social change and structural transformation process. Specific
action strategies that intellectuals, and professionals, and activists
collaborated upon include campaigns such as the Infant Formula
campaign; international coalitions such as the International Coalition
for Justice in Bhopal; solidarity and protest organizations such as
Greenpeace; lobbying groups such as the Asia Pacific Forum on
Women, Law and development; regional networks such as the Asian
Regional Council on Human Rights; and social movements such as the
women's movement, the environment movement, and the consumer
movement."
Like intellectuals and political dissidents advocating human rights
in Asia, Chinese dissidents, and intellectuals 7 are and will continue to
be key actors in human rights advocacy and democracy reform in
China. 4 In order to identify possible opportunities for alliancebuilding across different political systems and cultural contexts in
working with domestic Chinese groups, we need to understand the

46 Clarence J. Dias, The Role of Human Rights NGOs in Asia, HUMAN RIGHTS OF
MIGRANT WORKERS: AGENDA FOR NGOs, at 13-16 (1993).
47 For a summary of the debates and history of Chinese human rights research and

theoretical work, see Zhou Wei, The Study ofHuman Rights in the People'sRepublic
ofChina,HUMAN RIGTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC, supra
note 2, at 83-96.
48 See, BRINGING DOwN THE GREAT WALL: WRITINGS ON SCIENCE, CULTURE, AND

DEMOCRACY IN CHINA (Fang Lizhi ed. &. James H. Williams trans., 1990); Liu
BINYIN ET AL., "TELL THE WORLD" WHAT HAPPENED IN CHINA AND WHY (Henry L

Epstein trans., 1990); Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and
Prospects for Democracy (1990); and SUZANNE OGDEN et al., CHINA'S SEARCH FOR
DEMOCRACY: THE STUDENT AND MASS MOVEMENT OF 1989 (1992).
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context, obstacles, and opportunities facing Chinese NGOs or human
rights/women's advocates attempting organizational strategies
situated within a politically authoritarian regime.49 In trying to
understand the role of Chinese NGOs in the context of an emerging
civil sector in China,5" a rigid model of NGOs would not address the
complex relationship between domestic and international NGOs and
the tensions that can arise in developing multiple and simultaneous
local, regional and global intervention strategies. Under the legal
framework established by the 1989 Regulations for the Registration
and Management of Social Groups, associations, scholarly groups,
federations, research associations, foundations, and promotional
groups must register and be operationally linked to a governmental
administrative unit (guakao danwei). The search for Chinese "NGOs"
that fit the characteristics of foreign NGOs is thus problematic given
this restrictive and pervasive oversight and supervision framework.
An examination of the role of the All China Women's Federation
(ACWF) within China and in the international arena during the
preparatory process leading up to the 1995 Fourth World Conference
on Women provides some interesting insights regarding the role of
Chinese NGOs and their relationship to international human rights
approaches. As the mass organization arm of the Party that acts to
implement Party policies and to inform Party decision-making on the
needs and interests of women, the ACWF (Fulian), occupies a
difficult position in carrying out its dual functions. The ACWF serves

49

Sharon K. Hom & Sophia Woodman, Going to Beiing With Open Eyes: Preparing
for the World Conference on Women, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, Spring 1995 at 18-21;
SHARON K. HOM, ECONOMIC REFORM AND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN CHINA:
STRATEGY BRAINSTORMING AcRoss CULTURES, FROM BASIC NEEDS TO BASIC RIGHTS:
WOMEN'S CLAIMS TO HUMAN RIGHTS 147-51 (Margaret A. Schuler ed.).
o A recent study of the rising number of Chinese foundations suggests that a range of
NGOs with Chinese characteristics is emerging and that these NGOs will contribute
to the development of an autonomous civil sector, but they will need to develop more
transparency and accountability in its financing structures, processes, and funding
decisions. The Rise of Nongovernmental Organizations in China, National

Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Inc., Policy Series 8 (1994).
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both as the propaganda arm of the Party, and the "service" counseling
and advocacy arm for women. At the same time, it is increasingly
clear to outside observers that the ACWF does not speak with a
monolithic voice for "Chinese women", nor is it free from internal
criticism.5 One of the current challenges facing the ACWF is the
articulation and development of a role for itself as an "independent"
women's NGO despite its Party affiliation. In this process, the ACWF
is negotiating the perceptions of international NGOs, the diverse
perspectives and roles of provincial and local fulians52 and the
theoretical assessments emerging from the growing number Chinese
women's studies centers,53 and its own relationship to the various
organs of state power.
As the preparatory process leading up to and the Fourth World
Conference and NGO Forum reflected, Chinese women found
themselves in exciting and difficult positions. Within the context of
existing Chinese political, legal, and cultural constraints, Chinese
women had to negotiate the tensions and opportunities of international
human rights exchanges. For many of them, this was the first time
they heard the expression, "women's rights are human rights." It was
also the first opportunity for many Chinese women to network with
counterparts from all over the world. Their silences during the
Conference and the Forum, as well as their voices, and their
reflections provide important lessons for the possibility and difficulties
of building networks and human rights strategies that draw upon on
international approaches.

51

See, e.g,. Li

XIAOJIANG,

Economic Reform and the Awakening of Chinese

Women's Consciousness, ENGENDERING CHINA 360-82.
52 For example, the Shanghai Fulian has recently developed its own set of enterprises
(a clothing boutique store, a hotel, and conference facilities) as an independent source
of income that might support expanded activities. Interview with Shanghai Fulian
tJuly 1994).
See, e.g., Tao Chen, Zhonguo Funu Jiefang Yundung Zouchienlema? [Is the
Chinese Women's Movement Moving Forward?]6 TANssuo Yu ZENGMING 23-27
(1993); Tao Jianmin, ShehuiJinbuyu Funu Jiefang[SocialProgressand Women's
Liberation] 6 TANssuo YU ZHENGMING 28-32 (1993).
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One Chinese journalist, Chuanrenyuan, noted:
Consciously or unconsciously, they put themselves
into the role of official spokespeople, enthusiastically
explaining the 'great progress made by women of our
country' and arguing with 'certain foreigners with illintentions.' China lacks an understanding of human
rights; it is even more lacking in comprehension of
feminism. Today, we should not only struggle with the
authorities to achieve the human rights and women's
rights that we need, but also with the men and women
who are permeated by several thousand years of feudal
culture and decades of Party culture.54
Chuanrenyuan concludes with the observation that more women
in China now dare to openly call themselves "feminists."" As Chinese
women "cross" with greater frequency literal or symbolic national
borders, the official efforts to enclose Chinese women within
nationalistic discourses have been only partially successful despite the
public acceptance by women of spokesperson roles during the
Conference. As reflections by Chinese women underscore, no matter
what the present obstacles, the opening up of discursive spaces during
this recent period and the seizing of opportunities presented by
women to engage in activist research, to use the newly established
women's centers to build a supportive place for investigation of social
problems, to create networks within and outside of China, the rich
memories of new friends, exposure to new ideas and approaches, will
Chuanrenyuan, Overshadowingfeminism: thoughts on the Beijing Women's
Conference CHINA Ricrrs FORUM Winter 1995 at 16-18.

54

55 The history of Chinese women's encounter with western feminism and the
problematized discursive position of feminism in China dates back to the New Culture
Movement of the early twentieth century. Translations for feminism includes
nuquanzhuyi, (associated negatively with bourgeois class values and western
feminism), and nuxing zhuyi, (appearing since the 1980's). Nuxing zhuyi has less
political, but more biological connotations. ENGLISH-CMHNESE LEXiCON OF WOMEN
AND'TH LAW, supranote 19, at 130.
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have ongoing impact that will be difficult to measure in the limited
time frames of the present. 56 I am not suggesting gender analysis or
feminism (in whatever formulation), as the exclusive or primary
framework for a Chinese human rights analysis. However, because
gender issues remain under-theorized in Chinese domestic human
rights discourse, I suggest a gender perspective to call for more work
on integrating gender issues theoretically and strategically into overall
human rights strategies.57
However, it is not only the discourse of nation-states that needs
to be critically challenged. In the wake of the widespread attention
and self- examination of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations,
the history of its global stewardship and international governance has
also been criticized. Peter Vale has argued that we do not need more
reformist thinking. Instead, he urges us to ask "first order questions"
-- questions necessary to re-conceptualizing the very nature of
international society and a new role for the United Nations.58 Like
Chandra Mohanty and other Third World feminists,59 Vale calls for
a re-conceptualization ofthe discursive maps that shape the definitions
and contexts of global political struggles. He points to the
contingency of discursive and material constructs and argues for the
possibility of our transforming existing discourses and material
realities;
The structures that dominate our lives, including
our approach to the U.N., are only as permanent
56

See, e.g., FORD FOUNDATION,

REFLECTIONS

& RESONANCES:

STORIES OF WOMEN

INVOLVED IN INTERNATIONAL PREPARATORY ACTIvITIES FOR THE

1995 NGO FORUM

ON WOMEN (1995).
57 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMANRiGHTS IN CHINA'S REPORT PREPARED
FOR FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN (1995); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
WOMEN IN CHINA: IMPRISONED AND ABUSED FOR DISSENT (1995).

' Peter Vale, Engaging the World's MarginalizedandPromoting GlobalChange:
Challenges for the UnitedNations at Fifty, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 283 (1995).
"' Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Cartographiesof Struggle: Third World Women and
the PoliticsofFeminism, THIRD WORLD WOMEN AD THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 1-50
(Chandra Talpade Mohanty et al. eds., 1991).
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as we make them. Crucial features of life, such as
democracy, nations, sovereignty, capitalism, the
Cold War, and even the U.N. have concrete
manifestations, but are simply constructs of the
human mind. They are but theories, which at
times certainly make us, but are also made by us."
In discursive human rights debates, as Vale suggests, we need to
continue to question the inevitability of dominant narratives,
constructs and the circumstances that give rise to these narratives. As
cultures are erased and created by globalization and emerging cultures
are contested and negotiated, what does it mean to speak
monolithically of an "Asian" culture even if tempered by nods to
diversity? What country entering "modernity" has escaped the imprints
of the imperialist and colonialist enterprise? How can we re-envision
the critical negotiation of cultures in ways that transcend essentialist
or nativist claims of "tradition" and that address this complex
colonialist history? Is it possible to expose the opportunistic mis-use
of "tradition" by authoritarian power-holders and at the same time
reappropriate "tradition" as one source of identity and community?
What kinds of multiple and simultaneous local, regional, and
international strategies can be explored?
I raise these questions not to try to address them in this brief
commentary, but to suggest examples of questions that resist neat
discursive frameworks such as tradition/modernity, West/East
native/foreign, and localfinternational and that shifts the focus beyond
a privileged statist perspective. As we theorize and implement
alternative approaches to human rights work, we need to keep all the
diverse global and local actors in our strategic line of vision. In this
brief review of some aspects of these Asian human rights debates, I
have pointed to the difficulties of reading across ideological, political,
cultural terrain, suggested the importance of opening the aperture on
the range of international human rights actors, and urged a more

' Vale, supra note 58, at 288-89.
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critical interrogation of the discursive strategies and statist
assumptions of human rights debates.
In the face of assertions of the diversity of history, culture,
language, and political and economic systems, by governmental and
non-governmental voices, we are still left with the challenges and
opportunities of negotiating the twin dangers of the universalistedging-into-imperialist position and a morally bankrupt absolute
relativism. Yet we cannot position ourselves safely outside of this
human rights landscape as neutral observers or disinterested
scholars.61 The intellectual and ethical-political challenge facing
human rights scholars is to create more empowering discursive spaces,
and to contribute to more human-centered structures and processes
that will promote social and economic justice. Human rights are
ultimately about justice, and the contest continues over content,
meaning and implementation. Against a backdrop of global human
rights debates shaped by the geo-political power maneuvers of nationstates and transnationals, justice is often manipulated or marginalized.
"Politics is driven by power, more or less constrained by justice.
Power works by pretending to be just. In thinking about human
rights, we should distinguish between what justice requires and what
those with power demand."'62 Human rights are too important to be
61 As

a Chinese-American legal scholar and law teacher working in the material west,

I situate myself partially in what Tu Weiming has described as "Cultural China", that
is China as inclusive of three symbolic universes, the mainland China, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Chinese communities overseas, and scholars elsewhere in the world interested
in China. Tu Wei-wing, CulturalChina: The Peripheryas the Center, THE LIVING
TREE: TE CHANGING MEANING OF BEING CHINESE TODAY 1, 13-14 (Tu Wei-ming
ed., 1994). Although I do not share Tu's optimism that these periphery sites outside
China might serve an alternative reference points for the mainland Communist system

nor as primary sites for the development of an autonomous intellectual force within
China, I do view the expansion of symbolic, imagined, and horizontal communities of
struggle as a useful strategy for negotiating the increasing porous cultural, economic
and political boundaries of nationhood. Hom, supranote 49.
62 Freeman, supra note 3, at 23. In quoting Freeman, I am using "power" in this
context to refer to the power of governments, multinationals, and other institutions of
concentrated economic and political power. I distinguish this from the inherent power

in each individual, or every civil or community group to challenge these dominant
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left exclusively to governments.

structures and to re-envision other social orders.

[Vol. 3

